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INTRODUCTION 
The world of securities fraud litigation was irrevocably altered on
June 24, 2010. On that day, the Supreme Court decided Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. and determined that no cause of
action exists for f-cubed transactions—transactions with securities
of a foreign company, on a foreign exchange, brought by foreign
claimants—under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) or its related regulations, namely Rule
10b-5.1 
The intervening year witnessed an exploration of the boundaries
imposed by this new Morrison doctrine, and thus far the courts have
not imposed any significant limitations on the “presumption against
extraterritoriality” espoused in Justice Scalia’s Morrison majority
opinion.2 Although the courts, shareholders, and corporate insiders
—both foreign and domestic—have remained focused on Morrison’s
repercussions for on-exchange securities fraud cases, few have
analyzed the potential repercussions the Morrison doctrine holds for
extra-exchange transactions, such as tender offers.3
Tender offers are public offerings made by an individual, group,
or corporation to purchase shares of another target company.4 Over
the last three decades, the number of securities-based cross-border
transactions has skyrocketed.5 In fact, as of 2010, over 33 percent of
“agreed transactions” involving U.S. public companies were struc-
tured as tender offers.6 In order to continue the success of the U.S.
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884, 2894 n.11 (2010); see also
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
2.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878; see, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-10-
922-DSF, 2011 WL 2675395, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011). 
3. The term “on-exchange” is used in this Note to refer to transactions that occur on a
stock exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ. The term “extra-
exchange” refers to purchases and sales that occur outside of an exchange, and can occur
directly between parties, for instance between a purchaser and a company issuing shares. 
4. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 98 (2d ed. 2003).
5. Ross A. Albert & Heath D. Linsky, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Approach to Cross-Border Transactions, in COMMON ISSUES IN SECURITIES LAW 41, 42-43
(Michela Falls ed., 2008).
6. See Jim Mallea, Timing to Close: Tender Offers vs. Mergers, FACTSET MERGERS (Feb.
24, 2010), https://www.factsetmergers.com/marequest?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_
20100224.html; see also Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Growing Number of Tender Offers,
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capital markets and promote foreign interest in U.S. companies and
shareholders, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has,
since the 1980s, made a concerted effort to make the United States
an attractive market for foreign investors, buyers, and traders.7 To
achieve this goal, the SEC has focused on lowering the transaction
costs of doing business in the United States and with U.S. share-
holders.8 The SEC’s primary method for lowering transaction costs
is a tiered exemption system.9 This system permits parties defined
as “foreign private issuers” to avoid some of the most costly regis-
tration requirements under the Exchange Act.10
In cases related to foreign securities before Morrison, U.S. courts
generally applied either a “conducts” test, an “effects” test, or an
amalgamated “conducts and effects” test to determine whether they
possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over a securities violation.11
Morrison overturned decades of precedent, established mostly by the
Second Circuit, and installed a “transactional” test to determine
whether a cause of action existed under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.12 Although the analysis in Morrison was directed to fraud
cases arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the language
Justice Scalia employed in his majority opinion lends itself to a
general application and theory of securities law. 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010 3:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/behind-the-
growing-number-of-tender-offers. 
7. See Albert & Linsky, supra note 5, at 46-47; see also Commission Guidance and
Revisions to the Cross-Border Tender Offer, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58597, 94 SEC
Docket 339 (Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Revisions]; Barbara S. Thomas, Extraterritorial
Application of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP.
L. 189, 191, 194-97 (1982). See generally Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-7759, 70 SEC Docket 2191 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Cross-Border
Tenders]. 
8. See 2008 Revisions, supra note 7, at 384, 430; Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at
2192-93; George A. Casey, U.S. Securities Law Issues in Tender Offers for Foreign Companies
That Are Not “Foreign Private Issuers,” M&A FOCUS (Shearman & Sterling LLP), Winter
2006, at 2. 
9. See 2008 Revisions, supra note 7, at 384, 430; Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at
2192-93.
10.  See infra Part I.C.-D.
11. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879, 2886 (2010) (discussing
the Second Circuit’s “threshold error” in considering the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction). 
12. Id. at 2886
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This Note considers the implications of the Morrison doctrine and
the “presumption against extraterritoriality” on cases arising under
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.13 It argues that the language in
Morrison naturally extends to limiting the extraterritorial applica-
tion of section 14(e) by exploring the definition of “transaction” as it
applies to the tender offer context. This Note also argues that a
failure to extend Morrison to tender offers will run contrary to the
SEC’s expressed intent to increase the appeal of U.S. markets for
foreign private issuers. Further, this Note explores congressional
intent as evidenced by Congress’s limited amendments to the Dodd-
Frank Act regarding extraterritorial application of the Exchange
Act. This Note concludes that applying Morrison to tender offers will
eliminate causes of actions under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act
against foreign private issuers for tender offers that fall under the
SEC Tier I and Tier II exemptions. 
I. BACKGROUND: TENDER OFFERS
A. The Basics
The term “tender offer” is difficult to define in the context of U.S.
securities law. At best, it may be described as “a public announce-
ment by an offeror to buy securities—most typically common
stock—of a publicly-traded company at either a set cash price and/or
in exchange for a set value of the offeror’s securities.”14 Tender offers
generally commence when one company, the bidder, mails offers to
the shareholders of another company, the target, and publishes a
summary advertisement of the offer in a reputable and accessible
publication, usually the Wall Street Journal.15 Although they may
be offered at any available price, tender offers are generally made
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006). 
14. JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 422 (2004); see HAZEN, supra note 4, at 98.
15. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE
SECURITIES LAWS 929-30 (3d ed. 2004); see also John M. Basnage et al., Cross-Border Tender
Offers and Other Business Combination Transactions and the U.S. Federal Securities Laws:
An Overview, 61 BUS. LAW. 1071, 1096 (2006). There may also be instances in which a
company issues a tender offer for its own shares. More leeway is provided for such cases. See
JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra, at 930. 
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at a price well above a share’s market price.16 Tender offers in the
United States must also be open to all security holders of the class
of securities targeted by the offer.17 The price offered to one
shareholder must be “the highest consideration paid to any other
security holder during such tender offer.”18 Generally, bidders must
also specify the minimum and/or maximum number of shares they
will accept in order to effectuate a purchase.19 
Tender offers first gained popularity in the 1960s as the principal
means by which to acquire companies.20 As the popularity of the
practice grew, so did instances of corruption.21 In order to ensure
fair dealing and proper accountability, Congress passed the
Williams Act in 1968, which provided for more detailed registration
requirements and more explicit fraud provisions.22 Specifically, the
Williams Act amended portions of sections 13 and 14 of the
Exchange Act. The section 14 amendments expressly dealt with
tender offers.23 Like the original Exchange Act, the Williams Act
also failed to define the term “tender offer.” This, however, was a
calculated move by Congress because “[i]t feared enterprising
parties would structure significant stock purchases so as to fall
outside of any static statutory definition.”24 To account for this
deficiency, courts and the SEC promulgated an eight-factor test to
determine whether a tender offer exists. The test was officially
adopted by the court in Wellman v. Dickinson.25 The factors are:
1) Whether there is active and widespread solicitation of public
shareholders, 2) Whether there is solicitation for a substantial
percentage of the issuer’s stock, 3) Whether the offer to pur-
chase is made at a premium over prevailing market price, 4)
Whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable,
16. See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT—TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK
ACCUMULATIONS § 4:2 (2012). 
17. See Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of “When” Rather than “What”: Tender Offers Under the
Williams Act and the All Holders and Best Price Rules, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 265 (2003). 
18. Id. 
19. See HAZEN, supra note 4, at 101. 
20. See id. at 98; JACOBS, supra note 16, § 4:2. 
21. See HAZEN, supra note 4, at 98.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (2006).
23. Id. § 78n. 
24. HAAS, supra note 14, at 423. 
25. 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 82 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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5) Whether the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed
minimum number of shares, 6) Whether the offer is open only for
a limited period of time, 7) Whether the offerees are subject to
pressure to sell their stock, and 8) Whether the public announce-
ment of a purchasing program precedes or accompanies rapid
accumulation of stock.26
These factors, as Congress wished, provide sufficient flexibility and
generality to reach the majority of tender offer transactions.
B. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14E
In relevant part, section 14(e) of the Exchange Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders.27
Regulation 14E includes the eight rules promulgated under sec-
tion 14(e).28 The rules under Regulation 14E run the gamut from
basic administrative requirements to avoid fraud,29 to regulations
addressing indirect fraudulent activities,30 to regulations addressing
direct market manipulation through inaccurate or premature
announcements of tender offers.31 These rules, although illustra-
tive, are not exhaustive of potential violations of section 14(e).32
26. HAAS, supra note 14, at 424; see Basnage et al., supra note 15, at 1079. 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
28. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-1 to -8 (2011).
29. See id. § 240.14e-1. 
30. Indirect fraud may consist of unconventional tender offers or share purchases by
insiders. See id. § 240.14e-3,-5; Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 24, 2008), in EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEC.
REGULATION IN EUROPE: A CONTRAST IN EU & U.S. PROVISIONS 855, 859 (2009) [hereinafter
Letter to Nancy Morris].
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-8. 
32. See HAAS, supra note 14, at 428, 438 (noting that a tender offer has to comply with the
general “antifraud requirements of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14E
promulgated thereunder”). 
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Generally, section 14(e) and Regulation 14E apply to any and all
bidders who choose to include U.S. shareholders in their tender
offers. 
C. Foreign Companies and Tender Offers to the United States 
In addition to the limitations on fraudulent activity, the Williams
Act created fairly stringent tender offer filing requirements under
sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Exchange Act.33 Originally, a tender
offer served as an automatic trigger for these filing requirements
regardless of a bidder’s domestic or foreign identity. Foreign private
issuers—a majority of existing foreign corporations—are defined as 
any foreign issuer other than a foreign government except for an
issuer meeting the following conditions as of the last business
day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter: 1) More
than 50 percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly held of record by residents of the United
States; and 2) Any of the following: i) The majority of the
executive officers or directors are United States citizens or
residents; ii) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are
located in the United States; or iii) The business of the issuer is
administered principally in the United States.34 
Such companies have limited contact with the United States outside
of general business dealings and are inherently foreign entities. For
these corporations, the strict filing requirements created by the
Williams Act imposed high costs—especially for those companies
that did not have easy access to SEC filing offices and registration
materials—and provided a disincentive for contact with U.S. share-
holders during tender offer transactions.35 Foreign corporations
incurred further costs when their domestic regulations conflicted
with the U.S. registration requirements, and they were forced to
comply with both legal schemes.36 The aggregate effects of these
difficulties slowly began to create foreign disinterest in U.S. share-
holders of foreign targets. 
33. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (2006).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4.
35. See Casey, supra note 8, at 2. 
36. Id. 
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D. SEC Response to Foreign Disinterest
The willful disinterest exhibited by many foreign corporations
eventually caught the attention of the SEC, particularly as the
number of foreign transactions and tender offers continued to grow
and disinterest in U.S. shareholders resulted in economic harm.37 In
1999, the SEC promulgated a two-tier exemption scheme for foreign
private issuers.38 In its 1999 release, the SEC expressly noted that
the alterations were meant to increase the interest of foreign
bidders in U.S. shareholders.39 The exemptions served to weaken
many of the most stifling registration requirements found in
sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Exchange Act.40 
The Tier I exceptions apply to tender offers between foreign pri-
vate issuers when U.S. shareholders only have beneficial ownership
of 10 percent or less of the target’s securities.41 Tier I exceptions lift
the majority of the Exchange Act’s registration requirements and
companies covered under Tier I exemptions become immune to
Rules 13e-3, 13e-4, Regulation 14D, and Rules 14e-1 and 14e-2.42
Tier II exceptions also apply to tender offers between private
issuers, but this exception applies when U.S. shareholders have
beneficial ownership of 40 percent or less of a target class of sec-
urities.43 This exception is much less lenient than its Tier I counter-
part, but still serves to decrease some costs associated with the
inclusion of U.S. shareholders in an offer.44 
In 2008, the SEC revised the existing two-tier scheme, extended
its scope, and simplified its application.45 Despite the purpose and
beneficial effect of these exceptions, the SEC failed—or refused—to
eliminate liability for foreign private issuers under section 14(e) and
37. See Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at 2192-93. 
38. See id. at 2191.
39. Id. at 2193.
40. See id. at 2192-93 (noting that foreign parties often sought “to avoid the application
of U.S. securities laws” and that the new rules were “intended to encourage issuers and
bidders to extend tender and exchange offers, rights offerings and business combinations to
the U.S. security holders of foreign private issuers”).
41. Id. at 2195; see Basnage et al., supra note 15, at 1087. 
42. See Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at 2195. 
43. Id. at 2198. 
44. Id. at 2214; see Basnage et al., supra note 15, at 1091. 
45. See 2008 Revisions, supra note 7.
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the majority of Regulation 14E.46 In fact, some commentators argue
that the SEC simply “wasted an opportunity” and did not take the
necessary measures to ensure consistent use of the U.S. shareholder
market by foreign private bidders.47 Those same commentators note
the immense trepidation with which foreign private issuers face the
prospect of U.S. securities litigation.48 The exemption scheme, how-
ever, still leaves these parties open to litigation in U.S. courts for
fraud in relation to the tender offers.49 The Morrison doctrine stands
to remedy this missed opportunity.
II. BACKGROUND: MORRISON
A. The Exchange Act, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the
“Conducts and Effects” Test
The express purpose of the Exchange Act is to regulate the
securities exchanges and over-the-counter securities markets.50
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act serves as the main protection
against fraudulent activities on and in relation to such markets.51
In relevant part, section 10(b) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any securities exchange ... [t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agree-
ment ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
46. See Basnage et al., supra note 15, at 1079-80, 1092. 
47. See David A. Katz, SEC Adopts Revisions to Cross-Border Transaction Exemptions:
A Missed Opportunity Including Comment Letter Re: Revisions to the Cross-Border Tender
Offer, Exchange Offer, and Business Combination Rules and Beneficial Ownership Reporting
Rules for Certain Foreign Institutions, in EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEC. REGULATION IN
EUROPE: A CONTRAST IN EU AND U.S. PROVISIONS 855, 857 (2009). 
48. See id. at 857-58.
49. Id. at 858 (stating that the 2008 reforms failed to “limit[ ] the potential exposure of
foreign issuers ... to the full panoply of U.S. anti-fraud, anti-manipulation and civil liability
provisions”). 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
51. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 541 (2011)
(noting references to section 10(b) as a “catch all” provision). 
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contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.52
The rules promulgated under section 10(b) further outline
potential violations of the provision. Historically, Rule 10b-5 has
proven the most significant rule within the section 10(b) regula-
tions.53 Together, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 work to “make un-
lawful the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”54 The strength of these
combined regulations has proven an attractive lure for “investors
around the world who are harmed by transnational securities fraud”
and has historically been used prodigiously against both foreign and
domestic corporations.55 Generally courts considered the applicabil-
ity of the U.S. securities law under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
be a question of subject matter jurisdiction.56 Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 most frequently apply when shareholders have lost their
investments because of a manipulation of stock or security value
that eventually resulted in a sharp drop in prices.57 
Before the 1960s, prior to the exponential growth of international
securities transactions, the district courts typically held that cases
related to foreign securities transactions could not be brought under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.58 Beginning with the 1968 case of
Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit, one of the most influ-
ential circuits in securities litigation,59 began to develop what would
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
53. Rule 10b-5 outlines several of the “instrumentalities” under section 10(b) and provides
a clear outline of what actions may violate section 10(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011); see
Lauren Macias, Note, The “Transactional Test” Replaces the “Conduct and Effects Test” When
Determining the Extraterritorial Reach of Private Rights of Action Pursuant to Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Robert Morrison, et al. v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 75, 83 (2011).
54. Macias, supra note 53, at 83. 
55. Beyea, supra note 51, at 537.
56. See id. at 546-47; Macias, supra note 53, at 79-80. 
57. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); In re Alstom S.A.
Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
58. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878; Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev’d, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). 
59. See Beyea, supra note 51, at 542 (noting that “the Second Circuit has been the most
influential court” in the securities field). 
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later be known as the “conducts and effects” test to determine
whether U.S. courts possessed jurisdiction over a given case.60 
In Shoenbaum, the court first outlined the “effects” test, which
focused on “whether there was a substantial effect in the United
States or on a citizen of the United States because of the alleged
wrongful conduct.”61 In Shoenbaum, shareholders of Baniff Oil Ltd.
brought a stockholder’s derivative suit against several directors and
Aquitaine, a wholly owned subsidiary of a French corporation and
the majority shareholder of Baniff stock.62 The shareholders alleged
that the directors and Aquitaine used inside information and their
control of the company to sell Aquitaine 500,000 shares of Baniff
stock at a highly undervalued price right before the company
publicly announced a major oil discovery.63 Baniff was a Canadian
corporation. The court in Shoenbaum held that the effect of the
Canadian sales was felt in the United States, and that such an
effect was enough to find subject matter jurisdiction under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.64 
The “conducts” test was then established in Leasco Data Process-
ing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.65 It focused on “[d]etermining
whether the wrongful conduct had occurred within the United
States to trigger the extraterritorial application of section 10(b).”66
In Leasco, the plaintiffs alleged that Robert Maxwell, a British
citizen, induced Leasco, an American company, to purchase shares
of his British company by fraudulent means.67 The court found that
some of the deceptive conduct employed by Maxwell occurred in the
United States, and stated that such domestic conduct was sufficient
to provide subject matter jurisdiction.68 Both the “conducts” and the
“effects” tests focused on whether the court had the power to hear
a given case and not on the actual merits of the litigation or even
60. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
61. Macias, supra note 53, at 85; see Shoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208-09; Kun Young Chang,
Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for Clear and Restrained Scope
of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 95 (2003).
62. Shoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204.
63. Id. at 204-05.
64. Id. at 206.
65. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. Macias, supra note 53, at 86; see Chang, supra note 61, at 96.
67. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1330.
68. Id. at 1334. 
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whether a claim existed under the relevant securities law provi-
sions.69 
Beginning life as two separate analyses, the “conducts” and
“effects” tests eventually merged into the “conducts and effects”
test.70 Courts utilized the concepts interchangeably when consider-
ing jurisdiction under section 10(b) cases.71 In practice, the “con-
ducts and effects” test implicitly raised issues of reasonableness as
the underlying logic suggested that if either the conduct of a foreign
party resulted in negative effects in the United States, or the
fraudulent conduct itself was located in the United States, then a
foreign corporation could reasonably foresee being within the
purview of the U.S. securities laws and U.S. courts.72 The reason-
ableness of a foreign company being brought into U.S. courts
seemed inextricably linked with subjugation to U.S. securities laws. 
Although the scope of the joint “conducts and effects” test grew,
its application was inconsistent at best, as the national identity of
the harmed investors in a given case weighed heavily on the
stringency with which courts applied the test.73 In cases in which
the harmed investors were foreign, the “acts ‘of material perfor-
mance’ performed in the United States ... must have ‘directly
caused’ the result[ing harm].”74 In cases with domestic investors, “it
was enough that acts ‘of material importance’ performed in the
United States ‘significantly contributed’ to that result.”75 Under the
“conducts and effects” test, courts continued to acknowledge the
existence of a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” but despite
the acknowledgment, they permitted foreign defendants to be tried
under U.S. securities law based on the outcome of the case-by-case
69. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
70. Id. at 2879.
71. Id. (noting that the Second Circuit found a combination of the tests was more useful
in determining whether there was enough U.S. involvement to merit jurisdiction in U.S.
courts). 
72. Id.
73. See id.; Chang, supra note 61, at 92 (“The scope of federal jurisdiction is inconsistent
and expansive, and this results in conflicts with other countries and the potential for
redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping regulations. Given the possibility
of being sued based on the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud provisions,
participants in cross-border transactions need an identifiable standard to guide their
actions.”). 
74. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (citations omitted). 
75. Id. (citations omitted).
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analysis.76 The disparate and uncertain application of the “conducts
and effects” test was thus criticized by foreign and domestic com-
panies alike.77 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
Morrison centered around a suit brought by foreign shareholders
against National Australia Bank.78 The Bank’s shareholders alleged
that the Bank manipulated financial models to cause a recent
acquisition, a Florida-based mortgage-servicing company named
HomeSide Lending Inc., to appear more valuable than it was.79
Eventually, the value of the mortgage servicing company fell and
the Bank was forced to write down the value, causing a decrease in
the Bank’s stock prices.80 The Bank’s shares were always traded on
the Australian Exchange, and only a small number of American
Depository Receipts81 were present on either U.S. exchange.82 This
drop in the share price resulted in litigation when foreign claimants
brought the case against the Bank in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.83 The Bank moved to dismiss the
case for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court
granted the motion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision, and the claimants appealed. 
76. See Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Securities Laws, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 2008, at 1 (“[I]ncreasing transnational businesses and an
increasing number of transnational securities fraud cases have brought application of the U.S.
securities laws to foreign persons, corporations, and transactions to the fore of federal
securities law issues.”). 
77. Id. at 2 (noting that the piecemeal treatment afforded to matters of extraterritoriality
by the Second Circuit did not live up to the legal needs of corporations, shareholders, or
investors).
78. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
79. Id. 
80. Id.
81. American Depository Receipts, also known as ADRs, are “negotiable receipt[s],
resembling ... stock certificate[s], that [are] issued by a U.S. bank to evidence ‘ordinary’ shares
of a foreign company that have been deposited with it and that are held at or by its branch
office in the country of origin.” JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 713.
82. The claims related to the ADRs were eventually dropped. As a result, the claim before
the Morrison Court was solely related to shares traded on a foreign exchange. Morrison, 130
S. Ct. at 2875-76. 
83. See id.
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In Morrison, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first
addressed a “threshold” issue in the Second Circuit decision and
decisively concluded that the appropriate question in cases brought
under section 10(b) is not whether the court has the power to review
the case, but whether a claim even exists under U.S. securities
law.84 After establishing this threshold, the Court also noted the
evident need for a uniform understanding of the potential applica-
tions of U.S. securities laws.85 According to Justice Scalia, the
Second Circuit’s efforts “produced a proliferation of vaguely related
variations on the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests” that provided little
consistency and much confusion.86 In order to replace the “conducts
and effects” test, the Court presented two concepts: the existing
presumption against extraterritoriality and the transactional test.87
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The presumption against extraterritoriality simply assumes,
barring a specific statement to the contrary, that all of the laws
issued by Congress are intended to refer solely to U.S. actors, or
actions by foreign actors within the United States.88 In short, actors
should not assume that any U.S. laws are intended to reach beyond
the country’s territorial jurisdiction.89 Justice Scalia found that
there was “no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that
section 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and ... therefore conclude[d]
that it does not.”90 He further noted that, because Rule 10b-5 was
84. Id. at 2876-77 (“[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject matter jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to a
tribunal’s power to hear a case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Id. at 2877-78 (finding that the uniform application of this law should be based on the
language and nature of the Exchange Act and stating that the Second Circuit’s belief that
congressional silence called for judicial interpretation was unfounded). 
86. Id. at 2880. 
87. Id. at 2877-78, 2884. 
88. Id. at 2877 (“It is a ‘long standing principle of American law that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 49 U.S. 281, 285
(1949))).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2883. 
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promulgated under section 10(b), the rule also possessed no
extraterritorial application.91 
2. The Transactional Test
In place of the discarded “conducts and effects” test, Justice Scalia
established a merits-based test focused on the location of the rele-
vant transaction.92 Specifically, the Court stated, “it is in our view
only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”93
The Court found justification for this test in the seemingly express
domestic purpose of the Exchange Act and in the purely domestic
application of several of the Act’s registration requirements.94 
Justice Scalia also found that sections 30(a) and (b) of the
Exchange Act provided definitive support for the transaction test,
as both provisions based their applicability on the “location of the
transaction.”95 Namely, he noted that section 30(a) expressly applied
its provisions to “a ‘transaction’ in a United States security ‘on an
exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.’” Section 30(b) likewise banned such application against “any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States” unless he did so against SEC regu-
lations designed to prevent evasion of the Act.96 Scalia noted that
this created an express relationship between congressional intent
and a transaction-based application of U.S. securities laws. 
91. Id. at 2881. One post-Morrison article has explored the idea that the lawmaking
authority upon which a statute is based in fact defines the scope and geographic reach of the
statute. See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV.
1019 (2011). Although the article barely skims the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities
law, it does bring up the concern that extending U.S. laws beyond domestic jurisdictional
bounds raises an issue of due process for those parties unwittingly brought into U.S. courts.
Id. at 1103-09. This fear is analogous to the concerns espoused by Justice Scalia in the
majority opinion. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880-83. 
92. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2884-85 (“The Act’s registration requirements apply only to securities listed on
national securities exchanges.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2006))). 
95. Id. at 2885. 
96. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)-(b). 
278 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:263
3. Post-Morrison Decisions
Many cases decided since Morrison have featured plaintiffs
attempting to challenge the confines and application of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality and the transactional test. The
majority of these decisions continued to limit the reach of the
Exchange Act. 
In In re Alstom, a class of domestic and foreign plaintiffs brought
suit against Alstom, a French corporation, under section 10(b).97 In
Alstom, the district court extended the domestic transaction re-
quirement to U.S. residents and noted that domestic claimants did
not possess a cause of action under section 10(b) if they purchased
shares of a foreign company on a foreign exchange.98 In In re
Vivendi, the district court further limited potential claims under
section 10(b) and held that the sale and existence of ADRs was not
sufficient to permit fraud litigation based on the underlying class of
stock.99 
The Second Circuit went even further in SEC v. Goldman Sachs
& Co. and reexamined the definition of “purchase and sale”—the
Morrison definition of transaction—in order to extend the applica-
tion of the Morrison doctrine to other components of U.S. securities
law.100 In Goldman, the SEC brought suit against Goldman Sachs
and one of its vice presidents, Fabrice Tourre, alleging fraud con-
cerning ABACUS, a collateralized debt obligation whose perfor-
mance was tied to securities backed by subprime mortgages.101 The
court in Goldman found that the terms “purchase” and “sale” were
linked to the concept of irrevocable liability and that a purchase and
sale occurred when a purchaser incurred an “irrevocable liability to
take or pay for” a security, and a seller incurred an “irrevocable lia-
bility to” provide that security to the purchaser.102 The court further
found that application of the Morrison doctrine to the Securities Act
97. 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
98. Id. at 471-73. 
99. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(noting that claims had to be limited to ADRs and their holders).
100. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
101. Id. at 149-50. 
102. Id. at 157-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court did not, however, choose
to address whether the terms “purchase” and “sale” could be properly separated. See generally
id.
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of 1933103 was warranted and that the transactional test also
applied to considerations of the extraterritorial reach of the
Securities Act.104 
Post-Morrison litigation continues to flood the courts but there
are currently no limitations on the presumption against extraterri-
toriality or the transactional test.105 Thus far, the Morrison doctrine
has succeeded in blocking many large securities class actions from
U.S. courts.106 Such an effect, evidenced by cases such as In re
Alstom and In re Toyota Motor Corp., has the potential to increase
the lure of U.S. markets for foreign private issuers, particularly if
the effect is expanded beyond the scope of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.107 
III. APPLICATION OF MORRISON
A. Extension to the Exchange Act at Large
Before it can be determined that the Morrison doctrine will
operate to eliminate causes of action for American shareholders
under tender offer regulations, it must first be established that the
holding in Morrison—and its underlying reasoning—can reasonably
be extended to other provisions of the Exchange Act. This task,
however, does not prove too daunting. Although the final holding in
Morrison applied directly to claims and cases arising under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5,108 the language and analysis that Justice
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006). 
104. Goldman, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64. 
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4904, 2011 WL
3251813 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011); Basis Yield Alpha Fund v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798
F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lapiner v. Camtek, Ltd., No. C08-01327, 2011 WL 445849 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2011). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105. Some commentators believe that such
effects are detrimental to the court system and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison
was unwarranted and will serve only to increase judicial lawmaking in the securities field.
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655, 664-65 (2011). 
107. See infra Part III. 
108. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (“Section 10(b)
reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or
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Scalia used in the majority opinion easily encompasses the other
provisions of the Exchange Act. Not only does the logic extend to all
provisions, but in many instances Justice Scalia’s language focuses
beyond section 10(b) to the extraterritorial application of the general
body of American securities law. 
1. Morrison’s Expansive Language 
Within the first pages of the opinion, before even discussing
whether a section 10(b) claim could be used for the case at bar,
Justice Scalia stated that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of
American law that legislation is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”109 Justice Scalia further
noted that without an express indication of extraterritorial reach,
a statute simply has none.110 He also found merit in applying a
general “presumption against extraterritoriality” that eliminates
the need for a case-by-case evaluation that inhibits the application
of a stable and predictable legislative scheme.111 Furthermore,
Justice Scalia noted that the Second Circuit was mistaken in finding
that congressional silence indicates a need for judicial deduction to
“‘discern’ whether Congress would have wanted the statute to
apply.”112 
It would be shortsighted to find that such broad language
was intended to apply only to the section 10(b) provisions of the
Exchange Act.113 As the Court noted, the statute at large is silent,114
and therefore Congress must not have intended for any of the
provisions therein to apply extraterritorially. In order for the
Morrison ruling to ensure the stability for which it was intended,
the “presumption against extraterritoriality” must apply to all
sections of the statute. 
sale of any other security in the United States.”). 
109. Id. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 
110. Id. at 2881.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2878.
113. See Brilmayer, supra note 106, at 671 (“The changes that Morrison might potentially
bring about are not limited to its original context.”).
114. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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The Williams Act, which amended the Exchange Act and im-
proved the tender offer provisions, further remained silent on any
extraterritorial application and simply inserted the tender offer
regulations into the larger Exchange Act scheme.115 Without any
additional indication of extraterritorial intent on the part of
Congress, a failure to apply the Morrison doctrine and the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality to every provision under the
Exchange Act would again give rise to unnecessary judicial inter-
pretation in the face of congressional silence. As the Court noted,
this was an issue “repeated over many decades by various courts of
appeals in determining the application of the Exchange Act” and an
issue meant to be nullified by Morrison’s championing of the “pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality” for all legislation.116
Further support for this application may be found in the Court’s
analysis of sections 30(a) and (b) of the Exchange Act, both of which
include specific clauses referencing the extraterritorial reach of the
provisions. The Court found that section 30(b)’s “provision for a
specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous if the
rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign
exchanges—and its limitation of that application to securities of
domestic issuers would be inoperative.”117 In the same sense, the
presumption against extraterritoriality must apply to all provisions
of the Exchange Act and may then be rebutted by either context or
specific provisions to the contrary.118 
2. Applying the Transactional Test
In addition to extending, or rather renewing, the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Morrison doctrine also imposes a
transactional test on the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.
Extension of this test to cases arising under the other provisions of
the Exchange Act is also appropriate. As Justice Scalia noted, the
interest meant to be protected by U.S. securities law is the “national
115. See generally Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78l-78n (1968)). 
116. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. 
117. Id. at 2883. 
118. Id. (“Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”).
282 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:263
public interest.”119 That interest is invoked by domestic transactions
that affect the United States at large and not simply a small class
of domestic shareholders or investors. Justice Scalia further dis-
cussed that the focus of the Exchange Act is not on the location of a
given act of fraud, but rather on the location of the “purchases and
sales” affected by that fraud.120 As the Court elaborated, the
Exchange Act does not simply focus on a fraudulent or deceptive act,
but rather on a fraudulent or deceptive act in relation to a regulated
activity.121 This same analysis may be applied to any of the other
provisions of the Exchange Act, and specifically to section 14(e). 
All of the provisions of the Exchange Act regulate conduct related
to or associated with securities and their issuance or sale.122 The
conduct in itself, although fraudulent or questionable, would not be
regulated by the statute unless it involved a given act in the
securities context.123 In the section 10(b) scheme, that activity is a
purchase and sale of a security on an exchange; in the section 14(e)
scheme, that activity is a tender offer.124 
The “purchase-and-sale” in the section 10(b) context may be
analogized to the tender offer in the section 14(e) context. The Court
rather scathingly noted that it “know[s] of no one who thought that
the Act was intended” to regulate foreign exchanges “or indeed who
even believed that under established principles of international law
Congress had the power to do so.”125 The same may be said for the
power of Congress to control foreign private issuers who include
U.S. shareholders in a tender offer bid.126 As discussed below, in the
119. Id. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006)). 
120. Id. at 2884.
121. Id. (“Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered....’ Those purchase-and-sale transactions are the
objects of the statute’s solicitude. It is those transactions that the statute seeks to ‘regulate.’”). 
122. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78.
123. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
124. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), with id. § 78n(e). 
125. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
126. This is a particularly relevant consideration given the SEC’s push to make U.S.
shareholders easily accessible to foreign bidders during cross-national tenders by limiting the
regulations and requirements that apply to such foreign bidders. See supra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text. The SEC’s intentions also provide a strong reason for the Morrison
doctrine to bar claims under section 14(e) against foreign private issuers. See infra notes 172-
73 and accompanying text.
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tender offer context, it is even clearer that Congress and the SEC
wish to minimize the extraterritorial reach of the tender offer pro-
visions as a general rule.127
The Court further made a broad statement regarding the extra-
territorial application of the whole Exchange Act to any transaction
occurring abroad:
[W]e reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in
this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad for the
same reason that Aramco rejected overseas application of Title
VII to all domestically concluded employment contracts or all
employment contracts with American employers: The probability
of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries is
so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application “it
would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws
and procedures.”128
Instead of specifically referring only to section 10(b), the Court
discussed the applicability of this concern to the extraterritorial
scope of the Exchange Act at large.129 It follows that such a general
reference was meant to require a relevant transaction be domestic
in order to result in a claim under the Exchange Act.130 Such an
application would also protect the autonomy of foreign governments
that possess the rights to regulate securities and transactions that
occur in their “territorial jurisdiction” and would prevent avoidable
clashes between U.S. and foreign securities law.131
127. See infra Part III.C. 
128. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256
(1991)). 
129. Id. This fact is particularly noteworthy as the opinion was written by Justice Scalia,
who is known for narrow categorizations and neat tailoring to the issue at hand. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even hints of such
broad language in Morrison suggest that, although the central holding referred to section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, this reasoning is intended to expand to the whole of U.S. securities law
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act. 
130. The Court goes on to note the concerns and fears expressed by foreign parties in
relation to the extraterritorial application of section 10(b). Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. This
illustrates the parallel between the concerns behind limiting the extraterritorial scope of
sections 14(e) and 10(b) and is additional proof that the application of Morrison’s transactional
test is appropriate for the tender offer context. See infra Part III.C.1. 
131. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885-86. 
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Several post-Morrison cases, some noted above, have already
found it appropriate to extend the Morrison analysis and doctrine
to other Exchange Act provisions and even general provisions of
U.S. law, such as a court’s discretion to utilize supplemental juris-
diction. For instance, in the case of In re Toyota Motors Corp., a
class of domestic and foreign claimants brought a claim alleging
fraud on the part of Toyota Motors in relation to its stock traded on
the NYSE.132
In addressing this claim, the court refused to extend supplemen-
tal jurisdiction—which it was entitled to do—to the Japanese law
claims that were closely related to the securities action under
section 10(b).133 The court found that extension of supplemental
jurisdiction in this context would be a clear violation of Morrison. It
also found that there may be “instances where it is appropriate to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign securities fraud
claims” but “any reasonable reading of Morrison suggests that those
instances will be rare.”134 The court’s discussion of supplemental
jurisdiction did not explicitly connote section 10(b) issues, but
simply related to the general reach of U.S. courts into the matters
of foreign securities law. However, the court still found the reason-
ing of Morrison and the clear intentions of the Supreme Court as
expressed therein sufficient to render unnecessary the reach of the
U.S. courts into foreign transactions. 
Furthermore, in SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,135 the district
court did not even question the application of the transaction test
and the Morrison doctrine to a claim arising under section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933;136 the court took the application of the
test to all securities law provisions as a given.137 In Goldman, the
court simply discussed the application of the term “transaction” to
the underlying activities covered by section 17(a) of the Securities
132. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-10-922-DSF, 2011 WL 2675395 (C.D. Cal.
July 7, 2011).
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id. at *7. 
135. 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
137. See Goldman, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (“Although Morrison did not involve or consider
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and although neither party cites any cases that apply
Morrison to Section 17(a), the court agrees that Morrison applies to Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act.”).
2012] BEYOND MORRISON 285
Act and dissected the underlying activity to determine what must
occur domestically in order for the U.S. law provisions to apply.138
This facile extension of Morrison to not only additional Exchange
Act provisions but all securities provisions shows the Morrison
doctrine should and could be extended to the entire Exchange Act.
That courts have affirmatively completed such an extension
suggests that they will likely continue to do so in other securities
contexts, and perhaps even in the tender offer context. 
B. Defining Transaction and Determining Domesticity 
The probable application of the Morrison “presumption against
extraterritoriality” and the Morrison transactional test to sec-
tion 14(e) of the Exchange Act will bring special attention to the
definition of transaction in the tender offer context. As noted, in the
section 10(b) context, a transaction is a “purchase-and-sale,”139 but
that definition will not necessarily apply to all transactions in the
Exchange Act. For instance, in the context of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, the transaction is an offer or sale.140 In the
same vein, any claim under section 14(e) must be evaluated based
on the definition of the relevant transaction. 
Although the language of sections 17(a) and 10(b) provides clear
guidance through which a court could determine the definition of
transaction,141 section 14(e) is not so clear. Section 14(e) simply
states that it is unlawful to make untrue or otherwise misleading
statements, and to commit fraudulent, manipulative, or other decep-
tive acts in relation to “any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in
favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.”142 This lack of clarity
138. See id. (stating that “[t]he Court’s analysis as to  IKB and ABN is not complete,
however, as Section 17(a), unlike Section 10(b), applies not only to the ‘sale’ but also to the
‘offer of any securities or security-based swap agreement,’” and finding that a domestic offer
would be sufficient as a transaction under section 17(a)). 
139. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). 
140. See Goldman, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 164. 
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (limiting the unlawful activity controlled by § 17(A) “offer[s] or
sale[s] of any ... security-based swap agreement”). 
142. Id. § 78n(e); see id. § 78j(b) (stating that it is unlawful to “employ ... [a] manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with “the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange”). 
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requires that the definition of transaction in the tender offer context
be evaluated based on the nature of the tender offer transaction and
how it affects the “location” of the tender offer transaction. 
As mentioned above, a tender offer is generally defined as “a
public announcement by an offeror to buy securities (most typically
common stock) of a publicly-traded company at either a set cash
price or in exchange for a set value of the offeror’s securities.”143 The
occurrence of a tender offer does not require that any actual sales be
made.144 Accepting the above cited definition, the most basic “trans-
action” constituting a tender offer is the public announcement: the
general offer to buy existing shares. 
At first glance, the public announcement may seem as if it is, in
fact, domestic. In most instances, to reach domestic shareholders,
foreign private issuers must provide for a summary advertisement
in the Wall Street Journal or a similarly situated publication.145
Looking at this requirement in isolation may lead one to believe
that the transaction, as related to U.S. shareholders, is firmly
rooted in the United States and provides a sufficient hook for a
finding of domesticity. Such a view, however, ignores the reality of
the situation. 
Tier I and Tier II exceptions apply solely to tender offers between
two companies that are foreign private issuers.146 A foreign private
issuer, by definition, cannot have a majority of its voting securities
owned by U.S. residents.147 In most tender offer scenarios, bidders
will seek to reach the whole existing class of a relevant stock.148 In
order to do so, companies will request tenders from all existing
shareholders of the target class, which means that the offer is not
simply directed toward shareholders within the domestic confines
143. HAAS, supra note 14, at 422.
144. A tender offer is made to purchase a minimum/maximum number of stocks. If the
required number is not met, then the offer may not succeed and the offering company will not
choose to purchase any shares. See id. at 424.
145. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 929-30. 
146. See supra Part I.D. 
147. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2011). To fit under the Tier I and Tier II exemptions, the
target company must have below 10 percent or 40 percent, respectively, of shares beneficially
owned by U.S. private equity investors. See 2008 Revisions, supra note 7, at 397; Cross-Border
Tenders, supra note 7, at 2195, 2198.
148. One of the eight factors in determining whether a tender offer exists explicitly
requires that there be “active and widespread solicitation of public stockholders.” HAAS, supra
note 14, at 424. 
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of the United States, but rather to all known target shareholders
regardless of location.149 A finding of U.S. domesticity would require
an isolation of one facet of the complete transaction in order to
establish a sufficient “domestic” foothold for section 14(e) to satisfy
the “presumption of extraterritoriality.” Such a separation would
run contrary  to recent post-Morrison holdings that have found
the separation of transactional components unwarranted.150
Furthermore, defining the tender offer by an isolated group of
shareholders assumes that such a group of shareholders is an
integral target of the bidder, important enough to bring the whole
transaction under U.S. law. This assumption, however, is unlikely
to be true because of the relatively low level of U.S.-held shares
permitted under the Tier I and Tier II exception criteria.151 Given
that the levels of U.S.-held shares may be so low as to be negligible,
such a soft hook for a section 14(e) claim is likely to deter bidders
from including U.S. shareholders in the original offer.152
Furthermore, isolation of the tender offer to U.S. shareholders to
serve as the necessary “transaction” would provide for disparate
treatment within a single class of securities.153 Such treatment was
one of the key complaints underlying the overturn of the pre-
Morrison “conducts and effects” test.154 A purpose of the Morrison
decision was to ensure equal and predictable treatment for both
foreign and domestic claimants,155 as the presumption against
149. In fact, as noted above, many foreign companies tend to avoid even including the
United States in their tender offers to avoid incurring any potential liability under U.S.
securities laws. See supra notes 33-36, 45-49 and accompanying text. 
150. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he
SEC alleges solely that there was a ‘sale’ without discussing the ‘purchase’ component of the
alleged transactions. At oral argument, the SEC was unable to provide any basis for
separating or distinguishing the ‘sale’ from the ‘purchase’ of any of the transactions alleged.”). 
151. See Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at 2193. 
152. As discussed below, such an effect is quite likely given the existing liability-based
hesitancy of foreign companies to engage U.S. shareholders in tender offers. See Basnage et
al., supra note 15, at 1120; Casey, supra note 8, at 2; Chang, supra note 61, at 92; Thomas,
supra note 7, at 192-93; see also supra notes 45-49. 
153. Namely, foreign parties could be held liable for the U.S.-focused portion of their tender
offer, but have absolutely no liability for identical offers to foreign parties.
154. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
155. Companies value certainty, and the Court, in Morrison, intended to provide that
certainty. See id. at 2881. Bidders would not care for the added burden of considering liability
based on the identity of a claimant. For instance, consider this scenario: foreign company A
issues a tender offer for shares of foreign company B. Both companies are foreign private
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extraterritoriality and the transactional test were meant to
eliminate the significance of the claimant’s identity.156 
Alternatively, and more convincingly, the location of the transac-
tion, or rather public announcement, under section 14(e) will likely
be determined by the country from which it is issued. The many
aspects of a tender offer—the publications, prices, mailings, adver-
tisements, etc.—are likely to be coordinated from a company’s
principal business headquarters.157 Even if the foreign company
possessed a satellite office in the United States, final decisions
regarding acceptance of tenders or price changes would, in general
corporate practice, have to be approved by headquarters.158 As all
relevant decisions must be made through a foreign company’s
domestic seat, it is appropriate that the location of the bidder—the
same place from which the “public announcement” was issued—
should serve as the location of the transaction. After all, given that
cross-country tender offers may span dozens of jurisdictions, the
location of the bidder stands as the only common geographical link. 
Support for using the public announcement’s locus is also found
in existing post-Morrison decisions. For instance, in Goldman, the
court found the location from which the offer e-mail was issued, and
not where it was received, to be central in determining whether the
offer was a domestic transaction.159 Although the Securities Act of
1933 provides a clear definition of “offer,” the Exchange Act does not
issuers, and subject to the Tier I or Tier II exceptions. Company A publicly announces the
offer to all holders of the target security class, including U.S. shareholders. If the domesticity
of the transaction was decided by the class of U.S. shareholders, then those holders would be
the only ones who could bring a claim under section 14(e), as foreign shareholders would not
be found to participate in a domestic transaction. Given the current undeveloped status of
Morrison’s impact in relation to section 14(e), or generally with regard to supplemental
jurisdiction, a foreign company would have absolutely no certainty of the potential scope of
its liability. As noted above, such uncertainty and exposure to such a high level of liability
would likely result in the existing group of U.S. securities holders in the target class
completely ignoring foreign bidders. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
156. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881, 2884-86 (discussing the benefits of eschewing a case-by-
case analysis, and instead arguing for equal application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the transactional test). 
157. See E.ON AG v. Acciona, S.A., 468 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The Acciona
buying program was ‘predominantly foreign.’ Acciona, a foreign company, made the critical
decisions at issue here in Spain, directed the buying campaign from Spain, and acquired the
shares of a Spanish issuer through trades executed on the Madrid stock exchange.”).
158. See id.
159. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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provide a clear definition of the term “tender offer.” However, given
the close relationship between the two statutes and the recurring
reference to the Securities Act in the Exchange Act,160 some
parallels can be drawn. For instance, the section 17(a) definition of
“offer” states that an offer includes any attempt to dispose of or
solicit an offer to buy a security.161 The court in Goldman, applying
the analysis in Morrison, developed a transaction test for the section
17(a) offer context and found that “[i]n order for an ‘offer’ to be
domestic, a person or entity must (1) ‘attempt or offer[,]’ in the
United States, ‘to dispose of’ securities or security-based swaps or
(2) ‘solicit[,]’ in the United States, ‘an offer to buy’ securities or
security-based swaps.”162 Neither possibility allows for the location
of the offer recipient to be determinative of domesticity. It follows
from the Goldman court’s reasoning that if an offer issued from the
United States to a foreign company is not foreign, then an offer
issued from a foreign company to the United States is not
domestic.163 Additionally, several other post-Morrison decisions have
clarified that the location of a transaction is not, by definition, the
location of the purchaser but rather where the transaction itself is
completed.164 
As discussed above, the tender offer transaction should be defined
as the offer itself and not any eventual purchase, and the offer is
completed once a public announcement is made by the bidder.165
Since a public announcement is presumably directed from and
160. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(vii)(I) (2006).
161. Id. § 78a.
162. Goldman, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
163. Id. 
164. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Though the Supreme Court in Morrison did not explicitly define the phrase ‘domestic
transactions,’ there can be little doubt that the phrase was intended to be a reference to the
location of the transaction, not to the location of the purchaser .... As Judge Marrero has
pointed out, reading Morrison to permit Section 10(b) claims ‘based strictly on the American
connection of the purchaser or seller ... simply amounts to a restoration of the core element
of the effects test.’” (quoting Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 2010))). 
165. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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issued by the central headquarters of a company,166 the offer should
be viewed as arising from the location of the bidder’s headquarters. 
C. Policy: Respect for Foreign Legal Systems, SEC, and        
Congressional Intent
Apart from the practical realities of (a) finding the transaction to
be composed of the public announcement and (b) defining the
location of the transaction as the location of the bidder, there are
also several policy justifications for such a determination. First,
such an application will minimize potential clashes between foreign
and U.S. laws and serve to support the SEC in making U.S.
shareholders attractive to foreign companies. Additionally, such an
application would support congressional intent regarding the proper
application of securities antifraud provisions, as evidenced by the
silence of the Exchange Act and Congress’s failure to act after
Morrison.
1. Minimizing Foreign Law Conflicts and Supporting the SEC 
As noted above, one of the main reasons for foreign bidder dis-
interest in U.S. shareholders is the threat of antifraud and manipu-
lation litigation in the U.S. courts.167 Foreign bidders, however, are
not only concerned that they will be brought into U.S. courts for
clearly fraudulent or manipulative activities, but also that they will
be sued for activities that are perfectly legal and legitimate in their
own nations.168 One of the starkest examples of such situations may
be found in the “unconventional” tender offer scenario, whereby a
company makes extra-tender offer sales and purchases in its home
country that are perfectly legal under its regime.169 Apart from the
possible incongruity in registration requirements, incongruity in the
166. This presumption, of course, is rebuttable. As in E.ON AG v. Acciona, there must be
sufficient proof that the company directed the tender offer efforts from a non-U.S. location.
468 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Should evidence in a given securities case show that
a foreign private issuer did in fact choose to regulate a tender offer from a U.S. location, then
there may be a much stronger case for the U.S. domesticity of a tender offer, as the location
of the public announcement has arguably become domestic. 
167. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
168. See Letter to Nancy Morris, supra note 30, at 865. 
169. Id.
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definition and scope of fraudulent activity may impose significant
costs that companies simply are unwilling to bear.170 
The extension of Morrison to the tender offer context will help
remove this discrepancy between a bidder’s domestic laws and U.S.
laws. Providing a cure for such troublesome incongruity was also a
concern of the Morrison Court, which noted that: 
Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their domestic
securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring
within their territorial jurisdiction. And the regulation of other
countries often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud ...
[and t]hey all complain of the interference with foreign securities
regulation that application of section 10(b) abroad would
produce, and urge the adoption of a clear test that will avoid
that consequence.171
The concern for foreign laws in the section 10(b) context is nearly
identical to the concern in the section 14(e) context. Applying the
“presumption against extraterritoriality” to tender offers and
defining the location of a tender offer as the location of the bidder
will limit the possibility of claims against foreign private issuers in
the U.S. courts and stall the extension of U.S. tender offer laws to
foreign parties. Additionally, such an application would minimize
the clash between foreign and domestic fraud definitions, alleviate
the high costs associated with including U.S. shareholders in tender
offers, and thus appease foreign governments by ensuring proper
respect for their rights to regulate their national corporations. 
Alleviation of the high costs associated with U.S. securities fraud
litigation would also make U.S. shareholders increasingly attractive
to foreign bidders, a goal that the SEC has identified since the 1999
amendments.172 Target companies that fit within the Tier I and Tier
II exceptions, by definition, only have a small percentage of their
shareholders located in the United States and therefore use of these
shareholders in a tender offer is unlikely to provide sufficient
justification for a bidder to be subjected to the burdensome U.S.
170. See Katz, supra note 47, at 857-58. 
171. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885-86 (2010). 
172. See 2008 Revisions, supra note 7, at 342-43; Cross-Border Tenders, supra note 7, at
2193. 
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fraud provisions from which Morrison provided an escape.173 To
ensure that domestic shareholders receive the benefit of foreign
tender offers as the SEC wishes, the application of Morrison must
extend to the tender offer context. 
2. Promoting Congressional Intent
Morrison was decided just several weeks before the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.174 In
response to Morrison, Congress inserted sections 929P and 929Y
into the Dodd-Frank Act.175 These provisions explicitly preserved the
SEC and Department of Justice’s (DOJ) right to bring claims under
the Exchange Act in regards to f-cubed transactions, in direct
contradiction of the Morrison holding.176 The provision further
dictates that the SEC has the duty to conduct a study in order to
determine whether “extraterritorial private rights of action should
be reinstated” under the Exchange Act.177 In relevant part, section
929P states,
The district courts of the United States and the United States
courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of
this title involving—(1) conduct within the United States that
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even
if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside
the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States.178
This amendment indicates two things: first, that Congress was
aware of Morrison’s potential impact, and second, that Congress was
173. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text. 
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
175. See Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was
it Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199 (2011); see also Dodd-Frank
Act §§ 929P, 929Y. 
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
177. Painter, supra note 175, at 199.
178. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P.
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not prepared, or convinced of the need, to alter the central holding
with regard to private actions. 
The Morrison Court paid lip service to the concepts of congressio-
nal intent and purpose relating to the Exchange Act’s extraterrito-
rial scope.179 Indeed, at certain points the opinion appears to
resemble a judicial how-to book on creating an extraterritorially
applicable statute. It seems quite improbable—even sloppy—that,
given the decision’s focus, Congress would specifically choose to
address claims available to the SEC and the DOJ while remaining
(relatively) silent on the notion of private actions, and yet still
intend that such actions exist under the Exchange Act. 
Additionally, and of particular relevance to this analysis,
Congress applied this amendment to the whole of the Exchange Act,
not simply to section 10(b).180 Morrison clearly stated that Congress
may adjust the extraterritorial reach of an individual provision of
the Exchange Act even when the whole statute is under the
“presumption against extraterritoriality.”181 Congress’s choice to
preserve generally the SEC and DOJ’s right to bring an action
under all of the Exchange Act’s provisions indicates that Congress
was aware of a need to preserve actions outside of those arising
under section 10(b). By preserving only all fraud actions, including
those that could arise under section 14(e) for the SEC and DOJ,
Congress showed it was not yet willing to reestablish the private
actions Morrison effectively annulled. Consequently, failing to ex-
pand Morrison to the section 14(e) context would establish a
limitation Congress was not willing to impose. 
The existence of the secondary SEC study requirement provides
further support for this notion. Section 929Y states: 
The Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States
shall solicit public comment and thereafter conduct a study to
determine the extent to which private rights of action under the
antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78u-4) should be extended to cover—(1) conduct
within the United States that constitutes a significant step in
the furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transac-
179. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877, 2881-83 (2010). 
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
181. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-84; see Painter, supra note 175, at 206-07. 
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tion occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors; and (2) conduct occurring outside the United States
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States.182
This provision specifically instructs the SEC to determine, through
a public study, whether U.S. securities law should apply to foreign
transactions under the standards previously applied by the “con-
ducts and effects” test. The use of the terminology “should apply”
suggests acceptance of the current inapplicability of such stan-
dards.183 Although these provisions by no means foreclose the
possibility of eventual congressional action in favor of the “conducts
and effects” test for private actions, it does suggest that Congress is
not yet ready or willing to discount Morrison’s holding, and, for now,
finds the holding valid and applicable. 
It remains unclear whether Congress’s silence indicates approval
or a willingness to give the transactional test a trial run. However,
the Dodd-Frank Act amendments do reveal that Congress was
simply unwilling, for now, to limit the holding in Morrison or refute
the application of Morrison to the entire Exchange Act, including
section 14(e) and Regulation 14E. As a result, failure to extend the
Morrison doctrine to the tender offer context would violate congres-
sional intent, or rather, stymie congressional curiosity, as evidenced
by the Dodd-Frank Act’s immediate, direct, and limited response to
the Morrison holding. 
CONCLUSION
The Morrison decision undoubtedly reconstructed the application
of modern U.S. securities law. Through a careful examination of the
language and scope of the Morrison decision, the propriety of a
general application of its principles becomes evident.184 Courts have
already found it appropriate to apply Morrison to provisions in
182. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y. 
183. See Painter, supra note 175, at 202-05 (finding that a possible explanation for section 
929P was that congressional members had no wish to alter the extraterritorial reach of
section 10(b) after Morrison and only intended to overrule Morrison as it relates to claims by
the SEC and DOJ). 
184. See supra Part III.A.
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securities statutes outside of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.185 There
can be little doubt that the Morrison Court intended for the
presumption against extraterritoriality to encompass all sections of
the Exchange Act, including section 14(e) and Regulation 14E.186 An
examination of the nature of tender offers under the Exchange Act
further yields a convincing case for finding a “public announcement”
to serve as the transactional element of a tender offer.187 
The location of this “public announcement,” a necessary step to
determine the reach of U.S. securities law under Morrison, lends
itself to definition through the location of the foreign bidder.188
Given that control of a tender offer generally is initiated from a
bidder’s headquarters, and that tender offers may span dozens of
jurisdictions, the location of the bidder remains the single repeating
variable in the tender offer context.189 Post-Morrison cases have
already addressed that the location of a shareholder, offeree, or
purchaser is not determinative of the location of a transaction, and
thus the existence and inclusion of U.S. shareholders in a tender
offer is not a sufficient hook for a finding of domesticity.190 By
definition, foreign private issuers covered by Tier I and Tier II
exceptions have relatively minor interaction with the United States.
As Justice Scalia noted, “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterrito-
rial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the
United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”191 
It would be a violation of Morrison—as properly extended—to
permit claims under section 14(e) and Regulation 14E against
companies that by their nature, and as recognized by lax SEC
registration requirements, have a minimal relation to the United
States. Permitting such claims would only promote conflict between
U.S. and foreign laws and would run contrary to evident congressio-
nal intent.192 Furthermore, an application of Morrison—which
185. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part III.A.
187. See supra Part III.B.
188. See supra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text. 
191. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). 
192. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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results in a denial of potential claims under section 14(e) against
foreign private issuers involved in tender offers subject to Tier I and
Tier II exceptions—will fulfill the SEC’s missed opportunity in the
2008 exemption scheme revisions. This extension will also work to
promote the SEC’s express purpose under both the 1999 and 2008
exemption schemes to ensure that U.S. shareholders are not
bypassed by foreign bidders.193 
Application of the Morrison doctrine to the tender offer context
will have a strong positive effect on foreign bidders and their
willingness to engage U.S. shareholders. Domestic shareholders are
likely to find themselves in better position to receive a “premium for
their securities” and to “participate in [ ] investment opportu-
nit[ies]”194 as foreign bidders come to realize the decreased costs
resulting from the Morrison doctrine. In times when commodities
and securities markets are struggling, such an increase in interna-
tional transactions will prove a welcome gift, one the Morrison court
likely intended. 
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